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LISA BRESSAN 
ARISTOTLE’S METAPHYSICS BOOK K IN 
 PAUL NATORP’S NEOKANTIAN PERSPECTIVE 
ABSTRACT: In the modern age, the particular fact that qualifies book K of Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics as the only text in which the object of the science of being qua being is 
identified with the object of theology made the scholars to doubt its authenticity. The 
most important stance in this regard is that of P. Natorp, who, in the famous essay of 
1888 “Über Aristoteles’ Metaphysik 1-8 K, 1065 a 26”, recovering and studying in the 
light of the Neokantian philosophical perspective some observations of the leading 
scholars of Aristotle, such as V. Rose, L. Spengel, F. Überweg and W. Christ, tried to 
demonstrate its inauthenticity. For Natorp, since the  or  and the 
 are opposite entities, and since the one excludes the other, a science dealing 
with being in general is superior to all those sciences treating a particular field of being 
and cannot be identified with any of them, not even with the most important one. As a 
matter of fact, Aristotle genuine conception about the structure and meaning of 
metaphysics is that the  must also deal with the unmovable and 
immaterial being, but not only with it. On the contrary, this reading should be 
considered as the result of the interpolations made in the text by one of the compilers 
of the Metaphysics. Natorp observes that the most significant among these interpolations 
concerns the whole book K, which, according to the scholar, should lead to 
expunge the work of Aristotle (cf. P. Natorp, “Thema und Disposition der 
aristotelischen Metaphysik”, Philosophical Monatshefte, 24, 1888, p. 37-65, 540-574). 
RE  SUME  : À l’époque moderne, la particularité qui qualifie le livre K da la Métaphysique 
d’Aristote en tant que le seul texte où l’objet de la science de l’être en tant que être est 
identifié avec l’objet de la théologie fait douter les spécialistes de son authenticité. À ce 
propos, la prise de position la plus considérable est celle de Paul Natorp qui, dans son 
célèbre essai du 1888, “Über Aristoteles’ Metaphysik 1-8 K, 1065 a 26”, en approfondant 
les observation des autres spécialistes d’Aristote – à savoir V. Rose, L. Spengel, 
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F. Überweg et W. Christ – à la lumière de la perspective philosophique néo-kantienne, 
cherche à démontrer son inauthenticité. Selon Natorp, étant donné que l’ ou 
 et l’  sont des opposés qui s’excluent réciproquement, une science qui 
s’occupe de l’être en général doit être supérieure à toutes les sciences qui s’occupent 
d’un particulier domaine de l’être et cette science ne peut pas être identifié avec aucune 
entre ces dernières, même pas avec la plus importante. En réalité, la conception 
authentique d’Aristote à propos de la structure et de la signification de la métaphysique 
est celle selon laquelle la  doit concerner l’être immobile et immatériel, 
mais elle ne doit pas regarder seulement celui-ci. Au contraire, cette lecture doit être 
considéré comme le résultat de plusieurs interpolations du texte qui ont été réalisées par 
des compilateurs de la Métaphysique. Natorp observe que la plus significative entre ces 
interpolations concerne l’entier livre K qui, à son avis, devrait amener à la décision de le 
supprimer parmi les œuvres d’Aristote (voir P. Natorp, “Thema und Disposition der 
aristotelischen Metaphysik”, Philosophical Monatshefte, 24, 1888, p. 37-65, 540-574). 
KEYWORDS: Aristotle; Metaphysics; Book K; Natorp; Neokantism; Grundphilosophie; 
First Philosophy; Being qua Being; Theology; God 
 
Book K of the Metaphysics plays a major role in the historical transmission 
of Aristotle’s philosophy, because it demonstrates the interpretation of 
metaphysics as theology. It contains the famous passage in which being 
is identified with the divine being: being qua being is the separated being 
( ), that is the ultimate and supreme principle (
); consequently, the science of being qua being, that is first 
philosophy, is the science of the divine being ( ) and, therefore, 
theology ( ).1 
During the XIX century, however, this peculiar fact began to raise 
some doubts about the authenticity of book K.2 The most important 
                                                        
1  See Aristot. Metaph. K 7, 1064a 28-b1. 
2  Cf. V. Rose, De Aristotelis librorum Ordine et Auctoritate, Berlin, Reimer, 1854 
(who first expressed the thesis of the inauthenticity of book K); L. Spengel, “Über die 
Reihenfolge das naturwissenschaftlichen Schriften des Aristoteles”, Abhandlungen der 
Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 3, 1849; F. Überweg, Das Altertum, in Id., 
Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, Berlin, Mittler und Sohn, 1854; W. Christ, Studia in 
Aristotelis Libros Metaphysicos, Berlin, G. Bethge, 1853. Natorp is, however, the first to 
resume strongly the issue, already raised in the Renaissance, about the relation between 
ontology and theology in Aristotle’s metaphysics. As S. Menn noted in his interesting 
article on “Zeller and the Debates about Aristotle’s Metaphysics”, in G. Hartung (ed.), 
Eduard Zeller. Philosophie- und Wissenschftsgeschichte im 19. Jahrhundert, Berlin-New York, W. 
de Gruyter, 2010, p. 93-122, after the logical-epistemological criticism of the 
mechanical philosophers of the XVII century like Descartes and Gassendi, at the end 
of the XVIII century the interest in the Metaphysics increases again with the writers 
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stance was the point of view expressed by Natorp, who marked a turning 
point in the studies about the reception and the interpretation of the 
structure and the meaning of the whole Aristotelian metaphysics.3 
                                                                                                                                  
influenced by Kant, in particular Buhle (the editor of the Bipontine Greek-Latin edition 
of Aristotle, 1791-1800), Tennemann, Tiedemann, and Fülleborn. But these writers can 
be astonishingly rude about the Metaphysics, mixing summaries with dismissive criticism. 
They take the Metaphysics as a proto-version of the Wolffian metaphysics that Kant 
criticized in the first Critique. The first modern writer to treat the Metaphysics with proper 
respect, and to make it the key in understanding Aristotle’s philosophy, is Hegel in his 
Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Beginning in the 1820’s and especially in the 30’s and 
40’s there is an explosion of editions, commentaries, and monographs on the 
Metaphysics, as well as detailed and sympathetic accounts in larger histories of ancient, or 
all, philosophy (cf. i.e. C.A. Brandis, in Aristotelis et Theophrasti Metaphysica, Berlin, 
Reimer, 1823; K.L. Michelet, Examen critique de l’Ouvrage d’Aristote intitulé Métaphysique, 
Paris, J.A. Mercklein, 1836; V. Cousin, De la Métaphysique d’Aristote, Paris, Ladrange, 
1838; F. Ravaisson, Essai sur la Métaphysique d’Aristote, Paris, impr. Royale, 1837-1846; 
A. Schwegler, in Die Metaphysik des Aristoteles, Tübingen, Fues, 1847-1848; H. Bonitz, 
in Aristotelis Metaphysica, Bonn, Narcos, 1848-1849). All of these authors are well aware 
of the issue of the unity or non-unity of the Metaphysics, but their interest is not about 
the ontology-and-theology problem. Instead they try to reply in one way or another to 
the problem of composition raised by Samuel Petit and then Johann Gottlieb Buhle. 
Petit in his Miscellanea of 1630 notes that the Metaphysics is not listed in Diogenes 
Laertius’ catalogue of Aristotle’s works. So he tries to find titles in Diogenes Laertius 
that might be identified with single books or short book-sequences in the Metaphysics. 
Building on Petit, Buhle in 1788 makes a sceptical attack on the authenticity of the 
Metaphysics, admitting that Aristotle wrote a treatise on first philosophy but denying its 
identity with the text we have. The problem about ontology and theology is instead 
present in another author of the Renaissance, namely Francesco Patrizi. In his 
Discussiones Peripateticae of 1581 he argues that the Metaphysics is not one treatise but two 
Aristotelian treatises intermixed, ABKΛMN on ‘wisdom’ or ‘first philosophy’ or 
‘theology’ and ΓΔEZHΘI on the universal science of being, which later writers will call 
ontology. This difficult becomes a major concern again with Natorp in 1888, and will 
dominate scholarship on the Metaphysics ever since (see Menn, Zeller and the Debates, p. 
93-105). 
3  Every later scholar or expert who proposed a personal interpretation of 
Aristotle’s metaphysics and of the origin and the meaning of book K was obliged to 
take account of Natorp’s interpretation, which maintained that the science of being in 
its general sense cannot be identified with the science of a particular being. See also, 
among the others, W. Jaeger, Studien zur Entstehungsgeschichte des Metaphysik des Aristoteles, 
Berlin, Weidmann, 1912; H. von Arnim, “Aristoteles’ K und B”, Wiener Studien, 44, 
1929, p. 32-38; P. Merlan, “Metaphysik: Name und Gegenstand”, The Journal of Hellenic 
Studies, 77, 1957, p. 87-92; P. Aubenque, “Sur l’inauthenticité du livre K de la 
Métaphysique”, in P. Moraux-J. Wiesner (eds), Zweifelhaftes im Corpus Aristotelicum. 
Studien zum einigen Dubia, Berlin, W. de Gruyter, 1983, p. 318-344; V. Décarie, 
“L’authenticité du livre Kappa de la Métaphysique”, in Moraux-Wiesner, Zweifelhaftes im 
Corpus Aristotelicum, p. 295-317; G. Reale, Il concetto di filosofia prima e l’unità della 
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In his essay of 1888, Thema und Disposition der aristotelischen Metaphysik, 
Natorp states that the main difficulty of Aristotle’s Metaphysics consists 
exactly in the double interpretation of the task given to philosophy 
( ), which appears to be at the same time science of being in 
general and science of a particular kind of being, that is the divine being. 
About this, Natorp points out that  
since the  or and the  are opposite entities, and since 
the one excludes the other, […] a science which deals with being in general and 
with being qua being, and which is therefore prior to sciences which only deal 
with a particular kind of being, cannot be identified with one of these sciences, 
not even with the most important one.4 
According to the scholar, however, this double interpretation of the task 
of philosophy should not be ascribed to Aristotle, since his genuine 
conception is that the  must also deal with the unmovable 
and immaterial being, but not only with it. On the contrary, this reading 
should be considered as the result of the interpolations made in the text 
by one of the compilers of the Metaphysics. Natorp observes that the most 
significant among these interpolations concerns the whole book K, 
which – especially in chapters 1-8 – shows a greater attention to 
transcendent questions and, consequently, a smaller interest in the 
metaphysical problem of knowledge of nature.5 
                                                                                                                                  
Metafisica di Aristotele, Milano, Vita e Pensiero, 1961, p. 215-257; E. Martineau, “De 
l’inauthenticité du livre E de la Métaphysique d’Aristote”, Conférence, 5, 1997, p. 445-509. 
It is obvious, finally, that the question of the inauthenticity of book K has been studied 
by all the experts who investigated into the problem of the meaning of the whole 
Aristotelian metaphysics, and whose names cannot be all enlisted here. 
4  P. Natorp, “Thema und Disposition der aristotelischen Metaphysik”, 
Philosophische Monatshefte, 24, 1888, p. 37-65; 540-574, esp. p. 49-50: […], da 
oder und , einander ausschliessende Gegensätze sind, […] eine 
Wissenschaft, die vom Seienden überhaupt und als solchem handelt, gleichermassen 
übergeordnet, sie kann nicht zugleich mit einer derselben, und sei es die wichtigste, 
vornehmste, identisch sein. 
5  Therefore, Natorp is in contrast to Brandis’ and Ravaisson’s points of view. 
Although they both consider book K not as a mere summary but as an independent 
work, the former maintains that it was written before the related issues of the first 
philosophy developed in ΒΓΕ (and this explains its obscurity and its uncertainties, cf. 
C.A. Brandis, “Über die aristotelische Metaphysik”, Abhandlungen der königlichen 
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Before looking at the critical analysis of Metaphysics K drawn by 
Natorp in his essay of 1888, “Über Aristoteles’ Metaphysik K 1-8, 1065 a 
26”,6 which shows the textual reasons responsible for its inauthenticity, it 
is convenient to explain how, in Natorp’s Neokantian philosophical 
perspective,7 his thesis of the inauthenticity of book K is related to his 
interpretation of the topic and the structure of Aristotle’s Metaphysics.  
In Natorp’s point of view, the topic, that is the linker between the 
various parts of the Metaphysics (as if they were members of a unique and 
coherent body), is to be found – according to Aristotle himself – in the 
first book, precisely in Metaphysics A 1-2, and consists in determining 
“what is the nature of the science we are looking for, and what is the 
                                                                                                                                  
Akademie der Wissenschaften, hist.-phil. Klasse, Berlin, 1834, p. 63-87), while the latter 
considers it a later rewriting of the first philosophy, meant not to belittle the previous 
work, but to lay the foundations of a new exposition of the first philosophy (and this 
explains his increased depth, clarity and simplicity, cf. Ravaisson, Essai). According to 
Natorp, book K is certainly more flowing and much easier to read, but this is the result 
of a convenient attitude assumed by its author, who passes over the most difficult 
points (the argumentations of B and Γ are the most complex). Furthermore, the 
affected linearity of its style, which differs from the “typical Aristotelian conciseness”, 
makes us think of the paraphrasers’ talkativeness. As a direct consequence of this, 
Natorp observes – in contrast with Ravaisson – that Aristotle cannot have taken a step 
back (from the point of view of the contents) from the exposition of ΒΓΕ to the less 
complete exposition of K. On the other hand, if book K constitutes a simple outline – 
as maintains Brandis – its argumentation should be concise and obscure, packed with 
ideas, and not linear and clear as it actually appears. In addition, the realization of this 
outline, that is the argumentation of B, should be much more coherent, organized, 
stylistically compact, whereas it is rather obscure and complex. 
6  See P. Natorp, “Über Aristoteles’ Metaphysik K 1-8, 1065 a 26”, Archiv für 
Geschichte der Philosophie, 1, 1888, p. 178-193. 
7  As it is known, Paul Natorp is one of the three main exponents of the 
Neokantian philosophy of the Marburg’s School, together with Hermann Cohen e 
Ernst Cassirer (cf. H. Dussort, L’École de Marbourg, Paris, Presses Universitaires de 
France, 1963; J. Vuillemin, L’héritage kantien et la révolution copernicienne, Paris, Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1954; F. Châtelet (ed.), La filosofia del mondo scientifico e industriale 
(1860-1940), Milano, Rizzoli, 1975; U. Renz, Die Rationalität der Kultur. Zur 
Kulturphilosophie und ihrer transzendentalen Begründung bei Cohen, Natorp und Cassirer, 
Hamburg, Meiner, 2001). As regards to Natorp’s philosophical perspective, see C. 
Micheli, “Il problema dell’a priori nella filosofia di Paul Natorp”, Sapienza, 32, 1979, p. 
30-48; G. Gigliotti, Avventure e disavventure del trascendentale. Studio su Cohen e Natorp, 
Napoli, Guida, 1989; Ead., “Objekt und Methode. Das Problem der Psychologie in 
Natorps Philosophie”, in P. Schmid (ed.), Grenzen der kritischen Vernunft, Basel, Schwabe, 
1997, p. 95-114.  
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mark which our search and our whole investigation must reach”.8 
According to the Neokantian scholar, Aristotle meant to find a science 
which is knowledge of causes and first principles, that is of what is 
allgemeinste and abstracteste. This science is the philosophische Grundwissenschaft 
( ), mentioned by Aristotle in Metaphysics Γ 1, whose 
object is the , that is being qua being, which could be assimilated, 
according to Natorp, to the Kantian ‘object in general’ (Gegenstand 
überhaupt).9 
In the Critique of pure reason, Kant explains the problematic nature of 
the concept of ‘object in general’, which is directly related to the core of 
critical philosophy:  
all our representations are in fact related to some objects through the 
understanding, and, since appearances are nothing but representations, the 
understanding thus relates them to a something, as the object of sensible intuition: 
but this something is to that extent only the transcendental object. This signifies, 
however as something = x, of which we know nothing at all, […]. This 
transcendental object cannot even be separated from the sensible data, for then 
nothing would remain through which it would be thought. It is therefore no 
object of cognition in itself, but only the representation of appearances under the 
concept of an object in general, which is determinable through the manifold of 
those appearances.10 
                                                        
8  Aristot. Metaph. A 2, 983a 21-23 (trans. by W.D. Ross, in The Complete Works of 
Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, ed. by J. Barnes, Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 1984, ad loc.):
 
9  See Natorp, “Thema und Disposition”, p. 39.  
10  I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 250-251 (trans. by P. Guyer-A.W. Wood, in 
I. Kant, Critique of pure reason, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998): “alle 
unsere Vorstellungen werden in der Tat durch den Verstand auf irgendein Objekt 
bezogen, und da Erscheinungen nichts als Vorstellungen sind, so bezieht sie der 
Verstand auf ein Etwas als den Gegenstand der sinnlichen Anschauung: aber dieses 
Etwas ist insofern nur das transzendentale Objekt. Dieses bedeutet aber ein Etwas = x, 
wovon wir gar nichts wissen, noch überhaupt […]. Dieses transzendentale Objekt lässt 
sich gar nicht von den sinnlichen datis absondern, weil alsdann nichts übrig bleibt, 
wodurch es gedacht würde. Es ist also kein Gegenstand der Erkenntnis an sich selbst, 
sondern nur die Vorstellung der Erscheinungen unter dem Begriffe eines Gegenstandes 
überhaupt, der durch das Mannigfaltige derselben bestimmbar ist”. 
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Therefore, Kant establishes a difference between the object of 
experience, that is the phenomenon, which is the object for us, what we 
are given, and the transcendental object, which refers to a precise 
function of the process of knowledge of objects of experience, that is the 
unifying and objectifying activity of the pure apperception, which 
synthesizes and organizes the multiplicity of experience. 
However, the empirical object and the transcendental object are not 
two different entities: in fact, even if they never come to an identity, the 
one turns into the other. The empirical object represents the result of the 
cognitive process of the subject, the completed unification of the 
sensible data, whereas the transcendental object represents the function 
of the synthesis, of this reduction into unity. Therefore, the 
transcendental object is not to be considered as an object of knowledge 
placed side by side of empirical objects, but as something necessary for 
their formation: it is the result of a particular way of considering the 
process of formation of our knowledge of objects, whose focus is the 
subject’s ability of receiving and coordinating the sensible data, reducing 
them into unity and giving them a necessary nature which allows us to 
talk about them.  
Consequently, the empirical object and the transcendental object are 
not two different species of object inside the common genre represented 
by the object in general, but they are to be seen as two different ways of 
considering the cognitive process of the subject. These two points of 
view generate the concept of object in general as synthetic principle of 
human experience.11 
According to Natorp, the expression ‘being qua being’ could be 
assimilated to the Kantian expression ‘object in general’ since it is the 
Aristotelian concept which comes closest to the ultimate law of thought, 
that is to what makes every knowledge possible, to what allows the 
formation of the object. Nonetheless, this law of thought should remain 
                                                        
11  See A. Organte, “Dal ‘nihil negativum’ di Baumgarten all’‘oggetto in generale’ 
di Kant”, in G. Micheli-G. Santinello (eds), Kant a due secoli dalla Critica, Brescia, La 
Scuola, 1984, p. 275-282.  
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a mere requirement, which can never be satisfied by one of real factual 
positions. In fact, while every determined empirical position has its own 
structural limits, the requirement of the law is valid beyond every limit, in 
the field of unlimited. Since it represents the ultimate ground of all the 
entities mentioned, it must be superior – in its origin and logical 
extension – to all the other determinations. Consequently, also being qua 
being as well as the principle of substance should indicate “a law 
concerning how to proceed in constructing objects of experience, a law 
concerning a process of knowledge that is indeed infinite and without 
terminus”.12 On the contrary, Aristotle assumes that the object is given: 
object is precisely how we must conceive it. He thinks that objects in 
themselves, and conceived as completely determinate, must be 
constituted in the way that our knowledge posits them. Rather, the claim 
that an object ‘is’ thus and so can only mean that “it is to be determined 
by us, at whatever stage we have already reached and under whatever 
presuppositions of our knowledge, in that way, but that it can be further 
determined indefinitely”.13  
Yet, as Natorp points out, even if Aristotle did not think that an 
investigation into the object in general is related to the conditions and 
the laws of the possible objects of experience, when, wondering whether 
it belongs to one and the same science to treat of both the first principles 
of being or substance and the principles of proof, he answers that the 
ultimate principles of knowledge are precisely those that apply to being 
as such, he accords with criticism. In fact, if 
an object must, in accordance with the laws peculiar of knowledge, be thought in 
relation to and for the sake of knowledge, it follows that the primary laws of 
                                                        
12  P. Natorp, Platos Ideenlehre. Eine Einführung in den Idealismus, Hamburg, Meiner, 
1902, p. 407 (trans. by V. Politis-J. Conolly, in P. Natorp, Platos’ Theory of Ideas. An 
Introduction to Idealism, Sankt Augustin, Akademia Verlag, 2004): “dass er bedeutet ein 
Gesetz des Verfahrens, den Gegenstand in der Erfahrung erst aufzubauen, unendlicher, 
abschlussloser ist”. 
13  Ibid.: “Er ist für uns, auf der je erreichten Stufe, unter den jeweiligen 
Voraussetzungen unsrer Erkenntnis, so zu bestimmen, er bleibt aber dabei, und zwar 
ohne Ende, weiter bestimmbar”. 
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knowledge are equally primary laws of objects, in so far as there are objects of 
knowledge at all.14 
As it is clear, therefore, Natorp’s reading of the whole Aristotelian 
Metaphysics is deeply influenced by Neokantian interpretation of being qua 
being. From one hand, he approves and judges as authentic in their 
meaning those passages which consider the investigation of first 
philosophy as an investigation into being in general and into substance, 
as basis of all the particular sciences. From the other hand, he 
disapproves and judges as inauthentic all those passages in which first 
philosophy is equalled to a particular science, that is theology, in which 
the law of thought is satisfied by a particular factual position and being is 
reduced to a particular being, that is the divine.  
Consequently, Natorp esteems that the authentic books of 
Metaphysics are first of all book B, since – in the illustration of the aporias 
– Aristotle seems to determine the task of the science we are looking for, 
and book Γ, in which Natorp finds his definition of the science we are 
looking for as “eine generelle Wissenschaft vom dem, was überhaupt 
Gegenstand sei”.15  
Since this science concerns principles, causes and elements of a 
single nature in itself, that is substance, ( ), Natorp maintains that the 
main issue of metaphysical investigation is substance, as what comes 
conceptually first, from which everything else is derived ( ), 
according to the concept.16 In this sense, the object of the science we are 
looking for, that is the Grundphilosophie ( ), seems to be the
, that is the fundamental concept of substance itself.17 
According to Natorp, this conception is stated in a clear, coherent 
and explicit way in the central investigation of the work, beginning from 
                                                        
14  Ibid., p. 392: “weil der Gegenstand doch in der Erkenntnis und für sie, den 
eignen Gesetzen der Erkenntnis gemäß gedacht werden müsse, so seien also die ersten 
Gesetze der Erkenntnis auch die ersten Gesetze für den Gegenstand, als Gegenstand 
der Erkenntnis überhaupt”. 
15  Natorp, “Thema und Disposition”, p. 40. 
16  See Aristot. Metaph. Γ 1, 1003b 17. 
17  See Natorp, “Thema und Disposition”, p. 40-41. 
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book Z and including books ZHΘ,18 which he considers authentic. In 
these books, the investigation into substance takes only account – in 
Natorp’s view – of perceptible substances, but in the perspective of non-
perceptible substances, whose investigation is postponed in books ΛMN, 
which are included in the authentic plan of Aristotle’s work.19  
On the contrary, the scholar judges some passages of book E and 
the whole book K inauthentic, for they are in contrast with his 
interpretation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. In these texts, in fact, Natorp 
maintains that the philosophical science is, from one hand, the science of 
being in general and, from the other (but in the same sense actually), the 
science of a particular kind of being, that is of what is unmovable and 
eternal.20  
As far as book K is concerned, therefore, Natorp aims to 
demonstrate that its author included in it something more about the 
                                                        
18  See Aristot. Metaph. Z 1, 1028a 14, 30; 1028b 2, 7. 
19  See Natorp, “Thema und Disposition”, p. 543-545; 554-558; 561-571. 
20  As far as book E is concerned, the first chapter is – according to Natorp – a 
mere repetition of Γ 1-2, but since it doesn’t give a rigorous definition of the object of 
the quest, that is substance, it represents a step back rather than a step forward if 
compared to the previous investigation. The passages containing the contradictory 
formulation of first philosophy and the classification of theoretical sciences are to be 
taken off. Despite this removal, however, the remaining part of the first chapter of E 
can be considered an independent work, with evident bonds neither with the previous 
books (ABΓ), nor with the following ones. As a matter of fact, it represents a project 
which came before the introduction to first philosophy and which constitutes perhaps 
an outline revised and corrected by Aristotle himself in his later rewriting of books B 
and Γ, and discarded afterwards (cf. ibid., p. 546-549). As to chapters 2-4 of book E, the 
whole of their argumentation can be explained as an attempt to account for the 
difference between the different senses of being established in book Δ. They appear to 
have been written by a compiler, who found it strange that, in stating its object, the 
science which was to deal with being, did not take account of three of its meanings. 
That is why he wrote and included some passages drawn from Aristotelian 
assumptions. Since the compiler seems to know the logical meaning of being per accidens 
of Metaphyisics Δ 7, as well as its physical and more precise meaning contained in Physics 
II 5, he is likely to be a minor Peripatetic (cf. ibid., p. 549-554). Taking all these reasons 
into account, therefore, Natorp maintains that the whole book E, whose partial author 
could even be Aristotle himself, should be all the same removed from the original 
compositional structure of the Metaphyisics. About the problems of authenticity 
concerning book Epsilon of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, see E. Berti, in Aristote, Métaphysique 
Livre Epsilon (VI), Introduction, traduction et commentaire (forthcoming), and 
references therein. 
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transcendent, from the illustration of the aporias (in the part 
corresponding to the exposition of Metaphysics B). Consequently, in the 
passage of Metaphysics K 1, 1059a 34-38 we can read:  
but again the science we are looking for must not be supposed to deal with the 
causes which have mentioned in the Physics. For it does not deal with the final 
cause (for this is the good, and this is found in the field of action and movement; 
and it is the first mover – for that is the nature of the end – but in the case of 
things unmovable there is no first mover).21 
This argument, which should correspond to the illustration of one of the 
two thesis of the first aporia,22 as it is illustrated in Metaphysics K, works 
already – in Natorp’s interpretation – on the assumption that the science 
we are looking for should deal with what is unmovable, and only with it. 
As a matter of fact, not the causes but only the end, considered also as 
first mover – is taken into consideration. But the end cannot belong to 
the science we are looking for, because it belongs to the field of action 
and of movement and not to the world of unmovable things, which are 
the object of the mentioned science. 
However, aside from the inappropriate interference of the 
conception considering first philosophy as the science of the unmovable, 
what appears neglected in this passage is – according to Natorp – the 
concept of substance, whose crucial role in the investigation seems to be 
often pointed out by Aristotle. Natorp maintains that, in Metaphysics B 2, 
996b 12, Aristotle demonstrates in a significant way and by means of an 
argument which is coherent with his conceptions (Γ 2 and Z 1), that the 
                                                        
21  
 
22  Precisely in the first thesis, corresponding to Metaph. B 2, 996b 1-26, which 
states that it does not belong to one science to treat all the principles; from one hand 
because the principles are not contrary – whereas the science of the contraries is one –, 
from the other hand because unmovable realities do not have among their principles 
the either the efficient or the final cause and therefore the science studying these reality 
does not treat the mentioned principles.  
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substance has the right to represent the most important object of the 
science we are looking for.23 
According to Natorp’s, the speculative attitude of the author of K, 
which is extremely different from Aristotle’s, becomes even more 
apparent in the fifth aporia. While the difficult point of B (2, 997a 34-
998a 19) consisted in establishing whether the science we are looking for 
must only deal with perceptible substances or also with non-perceptible 
substances such as the Forms and the intermediates, in K it consists in 
deciding whether the science we are looking for deals with perceptible 
substances or not with them, but with certain others.24 Natorp considers 
obvious that Aristotle – especially in the preliminary passages of his 
metaphysical investigation – was far from thinking that the science which 
deals with being in general should not deal with the perceptible being. 
Quite the opposite: in Metaphysics Z 2 the investigation is temporarily 
confined to perceptible substances, whereas the question about the 
existence of other kinds of substances is mentioned but postponed.  
On the contrary, in Natorp’s view, the author of K considers the 
supersensible the only significant object of the science we are looking 
for. He states, in fact, that  
the Forms do not exist. But it is hard to say, even if one supposes them to exist, 
why the same is not true of the other things of which there are Forms, as to the 
objects of mathematics. I mean that they place the objects of mathematics 
between the Forms and the perceptible things, as a third class of things besides 
the ideal and the things of this world; but there is not a third man or horse besides 
the ideals and the individuals.25 
As Natorp points out, this passage contains several problematic points. 
Firstly, the author is thought to deny decidedly and definitely the 
                                                        
23  See Natorp, “Thema und Disposition”, p. 181-182. 
24  See Aristot. Metaph. K 1, 1059a 38-b 1. 
25  Aristot. Metaph. K 1, 1059b 3-9:
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existence of the Forms, whereas Aristotle has never opposed such a 
violent refusal to Plato’s doctrine, without explaining and discussing the 
reasons for his refusal. Secondly, the ‘third man argument’ (
) used by the author of K, is interpreted as a way not to refer to 
the technical argument used by Aristotle to criticize the doctrine of the 
Forms,26 but to put in doubt the existence of the intermediates. In other 
words, the ‘third man’ is not to be read here as the common predicate of 
both the intelligible and the perceptible man (predicate which is itself a 
Form, that is a third man existing beside the first Form of man and of 
perceptible man), but as the intermediate between these two entities. 
According to Natorp, the author of K seems to adapt Aristotle’s 
argument in order to support his thesis, whose purpose is to 
demonstrate that the science we are seeking only deals with what is 
separate and unmovable, and therefore it does not treat the objects of 
mathematics. These objects, in fact, are not ‘intermediate’ objects 
between perceptible and intelligible entities (since the intermediate do 
not exist) and – whatever they are – none of them can exist separately 
from the matter, nor does it deal with the perceptible substances, for 
they are perishable.27  
Natorp maintains that, in the seventh aporia, the author of K shows 
with the greatest evidence his real intention K, that is to completely 
support the idea that considers immaterial substance as the only object 
of first philosophy. He states, in fact, that  
                                                        
26  See Aristot. De ideis fr. 4 Ross (= Alex. Aphr. in Metaph. p. 84, 2-7; 84, 21-85, 
3 Hayduck); Metaph. A 9, 991a 17, where Aristotle calls ‘third man’ an objection already 
known in the Academy. It is known, in fact, that this objection is the rigorous 
reformulation of an argument dating back to Plato himself (see Pl. Prm. 132A-B). 
27  See Aristot. Metaph. K 1, 1059b 11-14: 
; cf. Natorp, “Über 
Aristoteles’ Metaphysik”, p. 183-184. 
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we seem to seek another kind of substance beside the sensible substances, […] 
and this is our problem ( ), i.e. to see if there is 
something which can exist apart by itself and belongs to not sensible thing.28  
According to Natorp, Aristotle never considered the immaterial 
substance as the ultimate and unique purpose and object of first 
philosophy: this conception is stated nor in Metaphysics A nor in B, and 
neither in Metaphysics E 1 or Λ. In this view, the interpretation given by 
the author of K could depend on the fact that he was greatly influenced 
by the transcendence of the final chapters of Λ but he did not really 
catch their real meaning. Finally, the scholar points out that also the 
omissions of book K show the systematic exclusion of matter from the 
metaphysical quest – which only treats the immaterial being. In fact, K 
does not contain the passage corresponding to the thirteenth aporia of 
book B, concerning being as ‘potency’ ( ), as well as the 
problem of movement, previously connected – in the first list of aporias 
of B – to the problem of potentially being.29 In Natorp’s interpretation, 
therefore, book K is not a work by Aristotle, even if it reproduces the 
aporias in their main content and speculative style (quoting even literarily 
some passages of B), but it is as an independent imitation marked by a 
speculative attitude which is often Platonizing.30 
                                                        
28  Aristot. Metaph. K 2, 1060a 10-13:
; see Natorp, “Über Aristoteles’ Metaphysik”, p. 185. 
29  See Aristot. Metaph. B 1, 996a 10-12. 
30  For the same reasons expressed by Natorp – exclusion of the matter and of 
everything connected with it, Platonizing attitude, identification of philosophy and the 
science of the divine –, in his Aristoteles, W. Jaeger instead of considering the chapters 1-
8 of K as inauthentic, supported its authenticity by means of a historical and genetic 
interpretation of Aristotle’s philosophy. While in the Studien (1912) Jaeger took into 
account Natorp’s intepretation of book K and criticized Natorp’s arguments from a 
philological point of view, in the Aristoteles (1923) he does not criticize those arguments, 
but solves them through his genetic method. According to his interpretation, K 1-8 
belongs to the early period of Aristotle’s philosophy, when the philosopher did not 
consider the concept of being qua being as the object of metaphysics (and so as the 
object of the dialectic illustration of different senses of being), but as “never changing 
and eternal reality”. In other words, chapters 1-8 seem to be a draft of the course of 
metaphysics corresponding to books BΓΕ, dating back to a previous period, in which 
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As to chapters 3-6 of book K, they show, according to the 
Neokantian scholar, a greatest fidelity to their model, that is to book Γ. 
                                                                                                                                  
the immaterial conception of reality is exactly the original characteristic of the primary 
metaphysics. In Metaph. K Aristotle is thought to use the term  giving it the 
same meaning chosen by Plato when he attributes it to Forms:  is a reality 
subsisting for itself and not as an attribute of a sensible thing (
), it is eternal and essential, existing for itself in a transcendent way (
). These Platonizing expressions, which – “in a rigorous Platonic 
way” – separate the pure concept of being from the matter, differ from the later draft 
of the work, and are therefore evidence, in Jaeger’s view, of its “golden authenticity” 
(cf. W. Jaeger, Aristoteles. Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung, Berlin, Weidmann, 
1923). In this way, according to Jaeger, in the first period of Aristotle’s thought the 
knowledge of the supersensible substance is reached directly through a sort of intuitive 
knowledge, a residue of Platonism. Later on, during the years of teaching in the 
Lyceum, Aristotle worked out his doctrine of the sensible substance characterized by 
the primacy of form. But this doctrine, contained in books ZHΘ, is initially extraneous 
to the core of the Metaphysics. In a third moment, Aristotle tried to unify the two 
doctrines, conceiving metaphysics not as an intuitive knowledge, but as a demonstrative 
knowledge of the existence of a supersensible substance, as required by the theory of 
the sensitive substance (this is the so-called Spätmetaphysik). The concept which allowed 
this unification to Aristotle is the new concept of being qua being, as capable to unite in 
itself all the different meanings of being. But, as Jaeger points out, this way to reconcile 
metaphysics as theology and metaphysics as ontology is impossible, because there is a 
contradiction between the two conceptions. As theology, metaphysics is a particular 
science, while as ontology it is a universal science. Aristotle himself noted this 
contradiction, and tried to overcome it in the final passage of Metaphysics Epsilon 1. In 
Jaeger’s opinion, this passage is a later addition made by Aristotle himself to the text of 
Epsilon, but it does not eliminate the contradiction, it makes it even more obvious. 
Jaeger concludes therefore that “the philosopher can’t have resolved the aporia, which 
presented itself only after Aristotle fused the two draftings. In fact both the deductions 
of the concept of metaphysics were not a single act of spiritual creation: two essentially 
different thought processes are embedded into each other”. The idea of a metaphysics 
split into two parts, divided between ontology and theology, reproposes Natorp’s 
interpretation. But Natorp considers as authentic only the conception of metaphysics as 
ontology, towards which his preference goes, while Jeager attributes both the two 
conceptions to Aristotle, as constituting two acts of thought, the first – the Platonic 
one – most ancient –, the second – the Aristotelic one – more mature and original. 
About the relation between Natorp and Jaeger, cf. E. Berti, Aristotele nel Novecento, 
Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1992, esp. p. 37-43, resumed in E. Berti, “La Metafisica di 
Aristotele: onto-teologia o filosofia prima?”, in A. Bausola-G. Reale (eds), Aristotele. 
Perché la metafisica, Milano, Vita e Pensiero, 1994, p. 117-143. In this article the author 
argues that it is not difficult to recognize in Jaeger’s interpretation the influence of the 
Νeokantianism, although Jaeger, like his friend Stenzel, tried to question the 
Neokantian interpretation of Plato given by Natorp. These two works are taken into 
account by G. Reale, Introduzione to P. Natorp, Tema e disposizione della Metafisica di 
Aristotele. Con in appendice il saggio Sull’inautenticità del libro K della Metafisica, trans. by 
V. Cicero, Milano, Vita e Pensiero, 1995. 
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In his view, the main difference concerns the connection between the 
principle of non-contradiction and the concept of substance, which he 
considers the core of the whole speculation about the formal principles. 
According to Natorp, the absence of this connection cannot be 
attributed to Aristotle: if so, he would have formulated a great number of 
unimportant and unnecessary remarks leaving out the fundamental 
point, which is the inner demonstration between the formal principles 
and the principles of reality. On the contrary, this lack must be ascribed 
to someone who neglected these important remarks because he had a 
poor speculative instinct and he had not caught their meaning.31  
                                                        
31  Recently, some scholars pointed out that the difference between the two 
treatises is far more radical, for it concerns the meaning of being itself (cf. Aubenque, 
Sur l’inauthenticité du livre K de la Métaphysique, and E. Berti, “La ‘riduzione dei contrari’ 
in Aristotele”, in Id., Studi aristotelici, L’Aquila, L.U. Japadre, 1978, p. 209-231). As a 
matter of fact, after stating that the term being is said  and not  
(1060b 32-33), the author of K maintains that being  
(1061b 12), creating therefore a real contradiction in terms. The author, in fact, 
worrying about the necessity to show that being is – despite its multivocity – the object 
of a single science, ends up stating that categories are modifications of being qua being 
(1061a 8), and supporting the thesis that the totality of being is reduced into a singular 
and common principle ( , 1061a 11-12) . In 
other words, in Metaphysics K 3 the hypothesis that the being is the object of a unique 
science is formulated in order to infer that the being can be predicated according 
something common ( ), and that it is a genre. The verb  – used in Metaph. 
Γ 2 to express the reducibility of the contraries to the unity and the multiplicity – refers 
here to the connection between the different meanings of being and the first of them, 
that is to the predication  (1061a 10-17). In the course on Aristoteles. Metaphysik Θ 
1-3. Von Wesen und Wirklichkeit der Kraft (1931), Heidegger introduces exactly the 
reduction of the meanings of being corresponding to the different categories to the 
 – reduction based on the scholastic analogia attributionis, as “participation” of the 
different meanings to the first –, with a reference to those passages of book K cited 
above, where the author indicates the reduction with the term  and defines the 
 as a . Heidegger still follows F. Brentano, Von der nach Seienden mannigfachen 
Bedeutung des Aristoteles (1862), not as regards to the reduction of the four meanings of 
being to the being per se – here he refuses this –, but as regards to the reduction of the 
categories to the  as ‘enticity’, as the very essence of being. This reduction allows 
to conceive God as the “supreme concretion of ”, as the ente per essentia. For this 
reason ontology is reduced to theology (cf. Die Grundbegriffe der Antiken Philosophie, 
course of 1926). The same interpretation of Aristotle’s metaphysics is in Metaphysische 
Anfangsgründe der Logik (1928), where Heidegger explicitly mentions the definition of 
first philosophy as science being qua being, given by Aristotle in Metaph. Γ 1, and that of 
philosophy as theological science, given in Metaph. E 1. He says that “philosophy as first 
philosophy has a dual character, it is science of being and science of the divine”. Then 
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In addition, these chapters too are considered to be corrupted by 
the conception – far more Platonizing than Aristotelian – that no truth 
can be found in the earthly and changeable things, so that the true must 
only be looked for in what is never changing and cosmic.32 Therefore, 
the author of K misunderstands the passage of Metaphysics Γ 5, 1010a 28, 
where Aristotle points out that general and universal remarks cannot be 
deduced from the simple observation of the sensible reality (or of some 
small parts of it). For example, we cannot say that everything is subject 
to a never ending movement, since in the sensible world too there is 
something unmovable, which is the universe ( ). What the author 
of K means, on the contrary, is that the things of this earth – , 
which should correspond to the expression , 
“the region of the sensible world which immediately surrounds us”, of 
Metaph. Γ 5, 1010a 28 – change and do not remain in the same state. 
Therefore, it is absurd to make them the basis of our judgement about 
the truth. For in pursuing the truth one must start from the things that 
are always in the same state and suffer no change.33 
As to the comparison with E – especially with chapter 1 – Natorp 
finds no significant differences, but the textual problems are repeated in 
an uncritical way, becoming even more serious in the imitation realised 
by the author of K. As in Metaphysics E 1, in Metaphysics K 7 too there is a 
distinction between the general science and the specific sciences: the 
former treats being qua being, while the latter only deals with a particular 
kind of being.34 The text of Metaphysics K 7 mentions, therefore, the 
theoretical sciences which only treat a precise kind of being, above all 
physics, as science of that which is inseparable from matter and has in 
itself a principle of movement. Nonetheless, the author of K – along the 
lines of E – points out that “since there is a science of being qua being 
                                                                                                                                  
he states that this duality is the problem already raised by Natorp in 1888. On the 
origins and developments of Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotelian metaphysics as 
onto-theology, cf. Berti, La Metafisica, p. 395-405. 
32  Cf. Natorp, “Über Aristoteles’ Metaphysik”, p. 188-189. 
33  See Aristot. Metaph. K 6, 1063a 10-17. 
34  See ibid. K 7, 1064a 2-3. 
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and capable of existing apart, we must consider whether this is to be 
regarded as the same as natural science or rather as different”.35 But 
physics deals with things that have a principle of movement in 
themselves, mathematics is theoretical, and it is a science that deals with 
things that are at rest, but its objects cannot exist apart. Therefore 
another science, that is the science of being qua being, will be the science 
of that which can exist apart and is unmovable, if there is a substance of 
this nature. This means, according to Natorp, that the fundamental 
philosophical science is – from one hand – the science of being in 
general, and – from the other hand – a science having as object a 
particular kind of being, the being unmovable and separable from matter. 
On the basis of his philosophical perspective, Natorp notices a 
contradiction in this double interpretation of first philosophy, since 
being in general – that is being qua being – and a particular kind of being 
– that is the divine – are opposite and the one excludes the other. In fact, 
a science dealing with being in general is superior to sciences treating a 
particular field of being and cannot be identified with any of them, not 
even with the most important one. This science must therefore give 
evidence to the metaphysical reality of every kind of being, establishing 
its existence as well as its essence.36  
Natorp observes, however, that the corresponding passage of 
Metaphysics E 1 – if it is correctly read – does not admit the interpretation 
given by the author of K. In Metaphysics E 1, in fact, Aristotle is supposed 
to maintain that if there is another kind of reality – different from beings 
constituting the specific objects of physics and mathematics – the 
science of this must be prior and must be first philosophy, or better, first 
philosophy in general. This means that this fundamental science – just 
like the specific theoretical sciences – should deal with things which are 
material and subject to movement, but also ( ) with things which are 
unmovable and immaterial, establishing their existence and essence just 
                                                        
35  Ibid. K 7, 1064a 28-30: 
 
36  See Natorp, “Thema und Disposition”, p. 50. 
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as it does with the other kinds of being.37 According to Natorp, on the 
contrary, the interpretation contained in K results exactly from the fact 
that its author neglects the  of lines 1026a 16 of book E, taking away 
its most obvious meaning and focusing on its context.  
In this respect, Natorp points out that the problem is not whether 
the divine is object of the fundamental philosophy or not, for he 
considers it a typical Aristotelian feature. In a passage of Metaphysics A 2, 
in fact, Aristotle – trying to define the object of wisdom – accepts also 
the opinion of those who consider it “science that deals with divine 
objects; […] for God is thought to be among the causes of all things and 
to be a first principle”.38  
Nonetheless, Natorp writes that “God is only one of the causes, one 
of the principles, while the object of the science we are looking for is 
represented by causes and principles in general”.39 In this perspective, it is 
true that first philosophy rises to the supreme rank of sciences exactly 
because it also investigates into the divine, but it treats this being in the 
same way as it treats the other beings, that is demonstrating their 
existence and essence. Only if there were something more to discover 
about the divine, this would become the object of a specific 
philosophical science, namely the object of “a second philosophy, 
( ), like physics”.40 However, Natorp denies this 
possibility in Aristotle’s thought, and states that the knowledge of divine 
only consists in the demonstration of its existence and essence made by 
first philosophy. Consequently, there is not a specific science about God, 
there is not a theology different from first philosophy, and it is 
                                                        
37  See Aristot. Metaph. E 1, 1026a 10-16. 
38  Ibid. A 2, 983a 6-11:
 
39  Natorp, “Thema und Disposition”, p. 52: “nur, weil Gott eine der Ursachen, 
eines der Principien ist, Ursachen und Principien überhaupt aber den Gegenstand der 
fraglichen Wissenschaft bilden”. 
40  Ibid., p. 52.  
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impossible to identify first philosophy with theological philosophy, since 
the divine is not the object, but one of the objects of first philosophy.  
This way, Natorp interprets the final section of Metaphysics E 1 – 
which considers the science mentioned above as the first science – in 
accordance with the Neokantian philosophical perspective, and judges it 
universal and fundamental for all the other sciences. This science is the 
science dealing with being qua being, and it is 
universal in this way (since it gives the common grounds of all the kinds of being), 
and it will belong to it to consider being qua being – both what it is and the 
attributes which belong to it qua being.41 
According to Natorp, the author of K, on the contrary, in his effort to 
preserve the identification of universal doctrine and theology, changed 
the meaning of these simple and clear words, writing that “there must 
necessarily be a science of this substance (the separable and unmovable 
substance) and this science must be different and prior to natural science 
( )”.42 
This way, the  comes to be considered as  and 
universal at the same time, as well as its object is both a particular 
substance and the  in general.43 
Natorp states that the fallacy of this interpretation is demonstrated 
not only by a correct reading of Metaphysics E 1, but also by the 
Aristotelian conception of divine, which is rather ‘sober’, since Aristotle 
did not name ‘theology’ an unconditioned scientific doctrine of God, nor 
                                                        
41  Natorp, “Thema und Disposition”, p. 54: “[…] und sie ist allgemein, eben 
sofern sie die fundamentale ist, (d. h. diejenigen Fundamente legte, die allen 
, gemeinsam sind), und ihr fällt die Forschung zu über das Seiende als seined, 
sowohl seinem Wesen als seien abhängigen Bestimmungen nach”. 
42  Aristot. Metaph. K 7, 1064b 11-14: 
. According to Natorp, the highest degree of confusion is reached by 
pseudo-Alexander, who writes: “this substance must be prior to natural substance, and 
the science of this must be the first and universal philosophy” (
), Alex. Aphr. in Metaph. p. 447, 23-25 Hayduck. 
43  See Natorp, “Thema und Disposition”, p. 64-65, note 46. 
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did he identify his philosophical doctrine with a ‘theology’. In fact, this 
would have meant lowering his speech to the level of myth, which 
Aristotle always uses in clear contrast with science.44  
In Natorp’s view, therefore, when Aristotle makes ready to 
legitimize, in a philosophical way, the concept and the existence of God, 
he confines himself in deducing and in qualifying it as one of the 
substances. It is certainly the most eminent and necessary substance – in 
order not to reduce the totality to a ‘bad tragedy’ – but, from a 
conceptual point of view, it is a substance exactly like the others. 
This way, Natorp maintains that the Aristotelian doctrine of God 
suits completely the doctrine of substances, as a constitutive part among 
the others, accordingly to the project of Metaphysics E 1. This project 
states that the fundamental and universal science of being is given the 
task to establish whether there are – in addition to the perceptible 
substances – also some unmovable, immaterial, supersensible substances, 
in the field of which human knowledge could – within its limits – find 
the divine, an instance which, in the scholar’s view, does not involve any 
identification between theology and .45 
According to Natorp, the identification between  
and theology dates back to immediately after Aristotle’s death, and it is 
to attribute to the Peripatetic school, where a theologizing tendency was 
spreading. Furthermore, it should be remembered that in ancient times 
nobody ever doubted about the Aristotelian origin of the identification 
between  and theology. Alexander of Aphrodisias, in his 
                                                        
44  According to Natorp, if we leave out the mentioned passage in E 1 and the 
corresponding one in K 7, the expressions , ,  do not refer to a 
scientific doctrine of God or gods, and then to a philosophical science; their most 
appropriate meaning is on the contrary related to poetical tales about gods, and 
therefore to myths, corresponding to the expressions , ,  
used in Meteor. B 1, 353a 35; Metaph. B 4, 1000a 9; Metaph. A 3, 983b 28; Metaph. Λ 6, 
1071b 27; Λ 10, 1075b 26. Therefore, the term ‘theology’ is considered to be generally 
related by Aristotle to a prescientific stage in the process of thinking, a stage which comes 
even before the most ancient physicists: see Natorp, “Thema und Disposition”, p. 55-
58.  
45  See Natorp, “Thema und Disposition”, p. 58. 
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commentary to the Metaphysics, ascribed the designation of the 
metaphysics as  – referring probably to E 1 and K 7– to 
Aristotle himself;46 Syrianus and Asclepius maintained that this is 
Aristotle’s idea, the latter substituting the term  with ;47 
Clemens of Alexandria stated: “Aristotle calls this kind of science (scil. 
) metaphysics ( )”.48 
In conclusion, it has been shown how Natorp’s thesis on the 
inauthenticity of book K results from the general interpretation he gives 
to the topic and the structure of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. We have tried to 
show that this interpretation is also influenced by the Neokantian 
philosophical perspective, so that the concept of being qua being, which 
represents the unifying link between the different parts of Aristotle’s 
work, is assimilated – within the limits – to Kant’s idea of ‘object in 
general’. Consequently, from Natorp’s point of view, also Aristotle’s 
metaphysical investigation becomes an investigation into being in general 
and the substance, which are the grounds of all specific sciences and 
correspond therefore to the ultimate law of thought, that is the law 
which makes every knowledge possible and allows the constitution of 
the object. This way, the science of being qua being cannot be reduced to 
                                                        
46  Cf. Alex. Aphr. in Metaph. p. 127, 23 Hayduck. In other passages he 
establishes an analogy between “the pursued science we mean to study, that is wisdom” 
with theology (Alex. Aphr. in Metaph. p. 171, 5-7 Hayduck:
). 
Furthermore, he also states in a more explicit way that the peculiar object of 
metaphysics, and so “of what Aristotle himself used to call theology” is the study of 
being qua being (Alex. Aphr. in Metaph. p. 237, 3-5 Hayduck: 
). As a matter of fact, Alexander seems to waver 
between this conception of metaphysics as the first science, which is identified with 
theology, and a conception – more faithful to Aristotle’s thought – of metaphysics as a 
general science, including theology as one of its species. In this respect, see P. Donini, 
“Unità e oggetto della metafisica secondo Alessandro di Afrodisia”, in G. Movia (ed.), 
Alessandro di Afrodisia e la Metafisica di Aristotele, Milano, Vita e Pensiero, 2003, p. 15-52, 
and references therein. 
47  See, respectively, Syrian. in Metaph. p. 878, 27 Kroll; Ascl. in Metaph. p. 519, 31 
Hayduck. 
48  Clem. Al. Strom. I, 28, 176. 
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the science of a particular factual position or of a specific being such as 
the divine. 
Nonetheless, some passages of Metaphysics are in contrast with this 
thesis and are therefore considered inauthentic by Natorp. While in E it 
is still possible to glimpse, behind the interpolations, Aristotle’s authentic 
thought, in K this is absolutely impossible.  
In Natorp’s interpretation, in fact, since book K shows a 
theologizing tendency, which culminates with the conception that the 
main philosophical science deals at the same time with both being in 
general and a particular kind of being, that is the unmovable and 
immaterial being, this book should be considered inauthentic. According 
to the scholar, therefore, book K is an independent imitation written by 
a Peripatetic, maybe a disciple of Aristotle’s himself. This follower 
rewrote the argumentation of BΓE in a shorter text, imitating his 
master’s style rather carefully, but – because of his poor speculative 
instinct and of his different metaphysical tendency – he misinterpreted 
some passages of Aristotle’s work, writing something more about the 
transcendent and something less about the metaphysical foundation of 
the knowledge of nature. This way, despite his faithful and entirely 
Peripatetic use of Aristotelian conceptions, the author of K 
misunderstood the purpose of his model, and gave his work a 
Platonizing or even theologizing speculative attitude.49 On the contrary, 
in what Natorp considers Aristotle’s authentic intentions, the science 
dealing with being in general and as such, that is the , is 
prior to sciences only dealing with a particular kind of being, and cannot 
be identified with any of them, not even with the most important and 
significant one, that is theology.  
 
 
                                                        
49  See Natorp, “Über Aristoteles’ Metaphysik”, p. 180. 
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